1:Sanders Z-5,M (1952-1959) 1962 EH1 Greece EH1

651 631 specialists think it undesirable to have over 90 percent of all taxes collected by the national government, as is done in Greece, even though much of it is channeled back through various services to the local communities. At the same time, they admit that there is great reluctance on the part of local authorities to take on the tax-collection function and that in those instances where they do collect local funds they do so inefficiently. Obviously, the golden mean has not yet been found in this delicate area of the relationship between local and central government.[53]

647 When the topic of conversation turns from the services to the officials who carry them out, local informants respond fast and furiously, much of the comment in disapproving tones. I have yet to find a description of Greek life, past or present, that deals very kindly with Greek officialdom. This might be said of many countries, but in Greece the lowly and even high-placed official is beset with so many difficulties that it is a wonder he functions at all. His first problem is the low standards traditionally expected 647 of the civil servant. Most Greeks think that it is perfectly proper procedure for them to bestow a favor upon some official so that he will give their case 662 preference, either in considering it before other cases or in recognizing certain extenuating circumstances in their favor. The law may or may not be abrogated and regular channels set aside, but the irregularities deal quite often with rearrangements and interpretations within the scope of the limits set by the law so that one person gets preferential treatment over others. When one comes face to face with the great number of papers that have to be signed to do even a simple transaction involving governmental authority, one realizes how great is the temptation to bribe or bring to bear some other consideration (such as working through the good graces of a relative of the official) to shorten the red tape and wind up the matter more quickly than usual. Not all officials would condone such measures, but they are subjected to much temptation.

647 A second problem, tied in with the first, is the low compensation which officials receive in the face of increased living costs. Since many government workers cannot live even modestly on their salaries, they take on [465] other commitments. These part-time jobs cause them to slight their full-[464] time government employment, for which supervision is frequently lax.

Insecurity in the job is a third difficulty for many of the higher officials. [661] The ministries, which in countries like France are run by highly skilled civil servants no matter how many cabinet ministers come and go, are [645] staffed in Greece by people, many quite capable, who are apt to be swept out of office when a new minister comes in. Many, because of sheer competence and skillful legerdemain, manage to survive from one change of ministers to the next, but are never sure that they will weather the next changeover. In some ministries there have been as many as forty different ministers in six years.

6: McNeill H-5 (1947, 1956) 1957
EH1 Greece EH1

The Political Cosmos

However real the changes which had come in the senior ranks of the civil service and in local government, it remained true that plans for economic development and for most local improvements depended ultimately upon cabinet ministers who held office as politicians and not as economic or any other sort of technicians. Cabinet ministers in turn held their high positions at the pleasure of parliamentary deputies, whose votes depended partly on party affiliations, partly on personal ambition, and partly on calculations of the state of opinion among the electorate.

As in other countries where a managerial bureaucracy does not enjoy unchallenged control of the governmental machine, the issues that have most excited the politicians and the public in Greece have not been questions of economic policy and priority. Everyone is in favor of economic development, everyone is against inflation; everyone is in favor of better salaries and pensions, and everyone is against an unbalanced budget. In other words, political debate is not carried on in responsible economic terms, and a government in office always finds it impossible to live up to wild promises its leaders made in campaign speeches.

This sort of irresponsibility is by no means peculiar to Greece. Most politicians in democratic countries, not least in the United States, behave very similarly. What lends the Greek political world its peculiar character is the nature of the political parties and the irredentist tradition of Greek nationalism.

Political parties in Greece (with the exception of the Communist party) formed in the past around the person of a political leader rather than around a program or around local political machines. The system worked effectively only when an unusually gifted individual appeared on the scene, who, by the

6: McNeill H-5 (1947, 1956) 1957
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665 magnetism of his personality, was able to control his followers and keep them faithful to him. Eleftherios Venizelos was able to exert such leadership during parts of his career, though even he was not always successful. General Papagos achieved something similar during the first year or so when he held office, before his failing health raised the question of the succession and induced his followers to start jockeying for position.

645 662 When no single commanding figure was able to dominate the political scene – and this was normal – then political life became a complicated intrigue among ambitious individuals. Every cabinet spent a lot of energy smoothing over personal frictions within its own ranks, and attempting to block schemes, originating from the outside, to disrupt its following in the Chamber of Deputies. In many instances, these preoccupations [433] [663] prevented the cabinet from paying more than casual attention to the really important issues confronting Greece: questions of economic policy, in particular, were often neglected, and awkward decisions, bound to disappoint powerful individuals, were sometimes put off indefinitely.

665. 666 645 [177] The introduction of the majority system of election in 1952 was conceived, both by its Greek advocates and by the United States Embassy, as a promising remedy for this situation. The effect of the new electoral law was to compel separate personal parties to form election coalitions, since without a coalition no party could hope for a majority if any two others joined forces. But the coalitions did not really destroy the personal parties. Instead, the leaders forming a coalition bargained together to decide how many personal supporters each would be allowed to insert in the coalition's slate of candidates. Questions of the apportionment of cabinet positions and other honorific appointments, to be awarded in the event of victory, were also explored if not always settled in advance. To be sure, Papagos resisted this process and made few promises to the politicians who

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joined his Rally; yet even he, when it came to appointing his cabinet, rewarded the most conspicuous leaders of personal parties who had merged their following into his, by appointing them to ministerial positions.

By 1956, when the commanding personality of General Papagos had been removed from the scene, the actual differences made by the new electoral law were a good deal less marked than might at first appear. Under the old proportional electoral system, the critical negotiations to form a cabinet occurred after the elections; under the new majority system very similar negotiations preceded the elections. In either case, personal followings gathered around a specially conspicuous individual were the basic elements from which cabinets and coalitions were built. Even these building blocks of the political edifice were not very firm; a leader might find, almost overnight, that "his" followers had gone off after someone else who seemed to promise something new or different.

How a man became a party leader was hard to say. Very diverse personalities were active in Greek politics, and some party leaders seemed, at least from the outside, to have little personal impressiveness. Inheritance was a factor in some cases. Sophocles Venizelos, for example, had made his political career on the strength of his father's name, and on little else. Men who lacked such an advantage normally established leadership by oratory in the Chamber of Deputies and through newspaper publicity.

As the game of politics was played, the opposition regularly enjoyed certain advantages. This implied a degree of instability for any government. First of all, in any distribution of ministerial seats and other plums of office, more contenders were bound to be left out than could possibly be included. Efforts to solve this difficulty by enlarging the size of the cabinet have been made from time to time, but always at the cost of effi-

6: McNeill H-5 (1947, 1956) 1957
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665 ciency, since the more voices that have to reach agreement
645 upon any policy, the more difficult it is to decide anything.
662 Hence the size of Greek cabinets has fluctuated very markedly since World War II, from over twenty-five to less than fifteen members. But even when a cabinet was made unwieldy by the effort to include as many potential supporters as possible, there were always more disappointed than successful candidates; and to such discontented persons it was a standing temptation to break party lines and vote the government down in the Chamber of Deputies on any convenient issue. In the ensuing cabinet reshuffle they might always hope to do better, having proved their indispensability to the government by unseating it.

665 Second, the opposition was always in the position of being
666 able to criticize without suggesting specific and practicable alternatives. It was easy to denounce half measures, to attack policies limited by the availability of money or of physical resources, to criticize the gaps between promises and actual achievements. The fact that much of what was thus attacked could not have been done much differently by anyone in power made little difference, since the opposition was not seriously concerned with what could or could not be done. Most politicians out of office were inclined to feel that any stick with which to beat the government, even a rotten one, was better than silence, so long as the stick hurt.

[663] The irrelevance of much of the language of political debate to the real, underlying problems of Greek society was easy to criticize from the outside. Yet a sober technical discussion of what the government could and should accomplish, of relative priority among the many desirable projects, and of long-range policies calculated to relieve overpopulation and underemployment lacked all political appeal.

471 The difficulty was that Greece faced a formidable political-
457 psychological problem. If large-scale investment on the basis
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lems Greece confronted. Inflating the currency to pay current running expenses and to finance a modest program of government capital investment proved far more palatable politically, even though such a policy penalized the salaried and wage-earning classes, and led to recurrent crises as the price level outran their incomes.

Greece shares this problem with other underdeveloped nations in which population growth tends to equal or outstrip increases in productivity, while at the same time superficial contact with modern economic ideas has convinced leaders of public opinion that poverty is neither inevitable nor necessary, but can and should be relieved by government action. Under these circumstances, the processes of parliamentary government are most unlikely to turn up politicians who dare to contradict the immediate desire of the electorate for an improvement of living standards. Political irresponsibility toward fundamental economic problems, of a type so widespread in Greece, is a normal and all but inevitable result.

To 1956, at least, the discrepancy between the tenor of political debate and the planning of technicians in the economic ministries of the Greek government seems to have had only slight effect upon the practical realization of economic plans. In some cases, the fact that the minister was so often distracted by the exigencies of the political game may even have given civil servants a freer hand than they might otherwise have had. But if this was so, the major reason for it was the existence of the American aid mission, and the ultimate dependence of most economic advance upon grants from American authorities. That is to say, a senior civil servant, when confronted by his minister, could always point out that if his plans were not approved, then there might be a reckoning with the Americans, whose ideas about how the Greek government should try to shape the economy had much in common with the civil servant's approach, and little with that of the politicians.